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The United States in the mid-1980s is engaging in an important, 
perhaps crucial, national debate on the goals, nature and effectiveness 
of governmental economic policy and its appropriate role in the American 
economy and society. As one significant element of this debate, much is 
being made of what is termed industrial policy. What "industrial policy" 
means depends upon the user; it ranges from being a euphemism for cen-
tralized government planning and intervention to a buzz word phrase 
referring to the more coherent application of policy tools already in use 
in the United States. Interest in industrial policy, however defined, 
has been heightened by perceptions of deep-seated difficulties in the 
American economy not treatable by traditional policy measures, by percep-
tions of Japanese industrial success and its competitive challenge to 
certain important American industries, and by perceptions of the success 
of Japanese industrial policy. 
At the same time, debate is under way on United States trade policy, 
ranging from very narrow specific issues to the appropriate nature of the 
international economic system and the respective roles of the United 
States and Japan in it. The application of industrial policy by foreign 
nations, notably Japan, is perceived to provide competitive advantage to 
selected targeted industries, to the disadvantage of their American 
counterparts. 
Thus, perceptions of Japanese industrial policy have entered the 
American debate on economic policy in two major ways: as a possible 
model to emulate in developing a United States industrial policy; and as 
a shaper of Japanese industrial structure and comparative advantage, 
especially vis a vis major American industries. It is not surprising 
that the main focus of American attention has been to understand how 
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Japan over time has successfully developed a number of major and now 
highly competitive industries (steel, motor vehicles, shipbuilding, 
consumer electronics) and to see an emerging competitive challenge in 
so-called high tech industries -- currently semiconductors, computers, 
robotics, telecommunication systems, optical fibers, new materials, solar 
batteries, industrial application of biotechnology, and the like. Less 
American attention has been given to Japanese policies for declining 
industries, and only limited attention to Japanese policies for defense 
industries. 
This essay is divided into four parts. In the next section I 
briefly discuss and define the nature and scope of the concept of indus-
trial policy in general and high tech industrial policy in particular. 
This is important because the term industrial policy has been defined and 
used in quite different ways within the United States, and Japan as well. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a general assessment 
of Japanese industrial policy — its successes and its failures --
because that is an obvious requisite for those attempting to derive 
possible lessons and implications for United States policy. Simplistic 
and misleading myths and stereotypes abound regarding the Japanese 
economy and Japanese industrial policy, and we should beware of what may 
be incorrect "lessons." All to often perceptions of the Japanese economy 
are outdated, conditioned excessively by the earlier high growth era --
from the mid-1950s to the early f70s — when Japanese industrial policy 
was in its heyday. Japanese industrial policy is discussed and evaluated 
in sections two and three. 
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In the final section I consider the relevance of the Japanese 
industrial policy experience for the United States, in its debates both 
on industrial policy and trade policy. 
§1. The Concepts of Industrial Policy and High Tech Industries 
Every nation pursues policies that significantly affect both the 
aggregate productive capacity of the economy and its particular industri-
al structure. Some policies have these goals explicitly, others have 
indirect and at times unanticipated effects on the economic structure. 
Some policies are macro, others micro. 
The term macro industrial policy has been used to describe policies, 
especially incentives to save, to invest, and to engage in R&D, that 
increase the productive capacity of the economy in the longer run while 
leaving it to the marketplace to allocate resources among specific 
industries. Macro industrial policy accordingly is focused on the supply 
side of the economy, in distinction from aggregate demand management 
which typically uses fiscal and monetary policy instruments. Macro 
industrial policies have long characterized Japanese economic policy in 
practice, though seldom described as such. A broad definition of macro 
industrial policy includes any macroeconomic policies to increase the 
quantity and especially the quality of the factors of production — 
labor, capital, and natural resources — and the general level of tech-
nology. This definition incorporates educational policy as an important 
element. It is noteworthy that Japan has an elementary and secondary 
school educational system which produces a substantially higher average 
level of literacy and of competence in natural sciences and mathematics 
than in the United States. It also has a college system, predominantly 
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private and of heterogeneous quality, that produces more engineers and 
especially electrical engineering college graduates than the United 
States, though fewer at the graduate level. 
However, industrial policy more typically is defined in micro terms: 
identification of certain specific industries deemed to be of sufficient 
national importance as to merit and receive differentially favorable 
policy treatment in order that those industries have access to resources 
in degrees or timing different than would occur through the normal 
operations of the marketplace. A range of policy instruments can be 
used: direct subsidy payments, tax benefits, government-supported 
financing, protection from imports or promotion of exports, direct 
government purchases, funding of relevant R&D, special regulatory provi-
sions, and so forth. The central point is the differential advantages 
government policy provides selected -- targeted, if you will — indus-
tries to their benefit and to the relative disadvantage of all other 
industries. Those propounding industrial policy as so defined assert the 
marketplace is not operating optimally due to market imperfections or 
outright market failure, so that specific government intervention is 
warranted. 
This definition of industrial policy, without reference to its basic 
objectives, to the policy environment, and to the utilization of specific 
policy instruments, is quite general. By this definition, the United 
States in fact pursues an industrial policy in the priority it gives to 
defense and aerospace industries, for example; and the continental 
Western European nations do so through regional development programs 
which in practice are keyed to certain basic industries such as steel. 
That is, simply referring to the "national importance" of an industry 
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while focusing on the resource reallocative results of government policy 
does not quite catch what the debate is mainly about, since the defini-
tion does not include the goals which give an industry national impor-
tance. (Unfortunately the goals are also often obscure in debate -- or 
patently self-serving.) 
The United States International Trade Commission provides a precise 
but narrower definition in its recent study of Japanese industrial tar-
geting. Equating industrial policy with Mtargeting,11 the report says: 
"International targeting is coordinated government actions that direct 
productive resources to give domestic producers in selected industries a 
competitive advantage11 (ITC, 1983, p. 20). This definition has two 
important elements. It visualizes policy implementation in terms of a 
coherent package of specific policy instruments. And it makes the 
objective of industrial policy explicit: to increase the competitive 
advantage of selected industries vis a vis the rest of the world, that 
is-, in a global market context. The industries selected provide tradable 
goods. There is an important normative implication some derive from this 
definition: it is natural and acceptable for a government to direct 
productive resources to military industries to achieve national security 
goals but it is not acceptable or fair for a government to interfere 
directly to create competitive advantage for selected civilian 
industries. 
The national security dimension creates two conceptual problems. 
First, civilian-oriented and military-oriented high tech industries are 
highly intertwined, so it is at times difficult to separate long-run 
competitive marketplace and national security interests. Second, the 
definition and determination of national security, and the routes to its 
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achievement, are not unilinear or simple. Prevention of military attack 
is a central objective, but not the only one. Japanese thinkers and 
policymakers have stressed the importance of comprehensive security, 
which includes economic as well as military aspects. Its most important 
component is guaranteed access to supplies of essential inputs for main-
tenance of the national economy. The obvious inputs are industrial raw 
materials, exemplified by oil, and foodstuffs. Less obvious but in the 
long run probably equally important for any major advanced industrial 
nation is access to technological innovation and its fruits. Moreover, a 
country has to be able to pay for imports essential for national secu-
rity: it has to produce goods demanded in world markets and it has to 
have access to those markets. To the extent this broader definition of 
national security is used (or invoked) then it is easier to argue that 
many high tech industries are strategic in a national security sense. 
Moreover, one can argue that high tech industries are strategic in 
an economic sense for large, modern, high income nations seeking to 
expand economic power and well-being. In an excellent, comprehensive, 
comparative study, Nelson (1984) lays out this argument well. High tech 
industries are the leading industries in a Schumpeterian sense. Two 
rationales can be provided for government industrial policy in support of 
these industries: the product cycle implies eventual loss of specific 
competitive advantage, while R&D to gain advantage is not fully appropri-
able by those engaging in it; inter-industry externalities accrue to 
users of high tech products, and domestic users benefit earlier and more 
rapidly than foreign users. 
High tech industrial policy focuses on the industries of the future, 
the winners, those where comparative advantage lies ahead. However, 
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there is another important strand in industrial policy, namely to "ra-
tionalize" or support major industries in cyclical or other temporary 
difficulty, or facing structural problems of declining competitiveness 
and comparative advantage in major product segments: helping the losers 
adjust to adversity, as it is sometimes crassly described. Any general 
evaluation of Japanese industrial policy must consider programs for 
industries in difficulty as well as those for important industries of the 
future. 
What is meant by high tech industry? In some respects the defini-
tion is analogous to that of heavy industry: it is not very precise but 
everyone has some intuitive understanding, frequently in terms of specif-
ic industry examples. There is a broad consensus that certain industries 
are high tech — semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, biotech-
nology -- but beyond these, and even as regards subindustries of these 
four, there is less agreement. In general "high tech industry" is a 
category which aggregates a number of specific industries with common 
characteristics — much like such categories as heavy industry, basic 
industry, or consumer durables. Similarly, one can conceptualize high 
tech industrial policy as being at an intermediate level between macro-
economic policy and (micro) industrial policy for specific, targeted 
industries. 
The essential feature of a high tech industry is its great reliance 
on the application of new science-based technologies to products and/or 
production processes. Yet sophisticated technological innovation takes 
place in most industries; the Green Revolution in agriculture, and new 
fibers in textiles are examples in sectors generally deemed decidedly low 
tech. Thus, innovation per se, and even involvement with science, is not 
fc 
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a sufficient condition. The intensity of scientific and technology 
effort and the speed of innovation are important features of a high tech 
industry, involving the production of significant new knowledge from a 
strong science base; in other words, being at the global scientific and 
technological frontiers. Rather than a dichotomy between high technology 
and low technology industries, it is better to think of industries as 
spread over a continuum between these two extremes. The position of any 
given industry may shift along the spectrum as new scientific knowledge 
(often exogenously) emerges, or a given line of scientific inquiry and 
technological application significantly slows down. More important 
probably, completely new industries emerge at the high technology end of 
the spectrum as a consequence of science-based innovation and new demands 
for the products (Doane, 1984). 
Quantitative indicators provide a useful, pragmatic approach to the 
problem of definition. A high tech industry is characterized by: a high 
ratio of scientists, engineers, and/or computer programmers in its work 
force; a high ratio of R&D expenditures to its sales; a high share of new 
products in its total sales. It is likely to have high actual and pro-
jected rates of growth of output and demand for its products. Capital 
intensity of production is not a particularly good indicator. 
While new consumer products may be the consequence of high techno-
logy industrial development, implicit in much of the discussion of high 
tech industrial policy is the perceived strategic nature of the industry 
-- not only in military terms but as a basic capital or intermediate 
product which has diffused more widely throughout the economy. Thus, 
video cassette recorders and other consumer electronics, rather than 
being considered as high tech indust ries, are often seen as the 
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consequence of other high technology industries such as semiconductors. 
Personal computers are considered high technology because of their 
productive usage not the consumption pleasures they provide. The per-
ceived linkages and externalities of almost an infrastructural nature are 
one reason why success in high tech industries is perceived as vital to 
the economic growth, well-being, and especially pre-eminence of a nation. 
That an industry is high tech does aot mean preferential treatment 
through industrial policy is required or necessary. The economic case 
for government support is the standard one of market imperfections or 
failure: high returns on average R&D activity combined with only partial 
appropriability by the doer; external benefits; high risk due to igno-
rance and uncertainty, often compounded by long lead times or the huge 
scale of required expenditures relative to firm size. However, the fact 
much private R&D has occurred and does occur without specific incentives 
does suggest many high tech industry activities would take place without 
special preferential treatment (industrial policy), and hence that such 
government programs create economic rents rather than incentives for 
additional activity. On the other hand, timing in the dynamics of high 
technology industrial development can be very important. In rapidly 
developing high technology industries being first or very close to first 
may provide significant learning and cost advantages over potential 
competitors. However, there are also cases in which the initial innova-
tion has not succeeded in solving sufficiently the scientific, techno-
logical, production, or even marketing problems, and has lost out to 
closely pursuing followers. 
Given the characteristics common to high tech industries and which 
distinguish them from other industries — in degree rather than kind --
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government policies to provide special benefit to high tech industries 
can derive either downward from macro policies or upward from specific 
industry policies, as is the case in Japan, In the United States, 
preferential treatment is intentionally provided high tech industries 
through macro policies which provide favorable tax treatment of R&D, 
rapid depreciation, and public training of engineers and scientists. 
These policies are premised on high tech.industries being characterized 
by spending relatively more on R&D than other industries, buying or 
selling relatively more capital equipment, and employing relatively more 
holders of degrees in science and engineering. 
The Japanese experience in industrial policy illustrates many of the 
conceptual and definitional issues of industrial policy. It is to that 
experience we now turn. 
§2. Japanese Industrial Policy 
A careful, detailed examination of Japanese industrial policy as it 
has been applied in practice over the postwar period shows that it has 
often been ad hoc in nature, not always carefully thought out or focused, 
usually quite flexible in response to changing analyses and circum-
stances, and on occasion subject to considerable political pressures. In 
other words, like much of history it was complex and messy, rather than 
simple and clear-cut. Nonetheless, by virtue of hindsight we can ab-
stract and generalize from the realities of the historical record in 
order to present general patterns and characteristics, without thereby 
claiming more for Japanese industrial policy than is warranted. 
With these caveats in mind, Japanese industrial policy can be 
characterized as follows. Its goal has been to enhance economic growth 
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by anticipating dynamically efficient allocation of resources by the 
criterion of world not just domestic prices; to this end it has selected 
certain key industries as essential for preferential treatment; and it 
has provided such treatment through a comprehensive, coordinated package 
of policy instruments. Further, Japan has conducted its industrial 
policy in a generally conducive and supportive domestic policy environ-
ment, that is, there has been a consensus on what was being done, and 
general economic policies and conditions were conducive to success. 
It is important to keep in mind that the goals, policy instruments, 
and policy environment have changed dramatically during the postwar 
period, and just what those changes have been. The postwar Japanese 
economy has gone through three phases: a decade of postwar reconstruc-
tion following the devastation of World War II; almost two decades, from 
the mid-1950s to 1973, of superfast GNP growth (about 10 percent annual 
average); and the most recent decade of 4 percent growth in a domestic 
and world environment of oil crises and stagflation. Industrial policy 
has evolved from one period to the next in response to these changing 
circumstances. 
Well into the second phase, Japan was a low-income, developing 
country, and pursued trade and industrial policies like those of many 
other such follower countries. Industrial policy played an important 
role from the beginning, initially with a strong domestic market orienta-
tion; reconstruction was felt to require special government help for the 
fertilizer, electric power, coal, steel, and transport industries. To 
some extent this built upon government thinking and programs initiated in 
the 1930s and even earlier. As the Japanese high-growth era progressed 
industrial policy, and the intellectual rationalizations of it, reached 
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their heyday. New industries -- chemicals, petrochemicals, and other 
intermediate goods — were added to the list for preferential support. 
These, like the other industries earlier, were regarded as high tech 
industries for Japan but were already well established in the United 
States. 
Between 1955 and 1973 the Japanese GNP increased almost six times in 
real terms. By the early 1970s Japan had become the world's third larg-
est industrial economy (following the United States and the USSR), with 
per capita incomes comparable to Western Europe. This profound surge of 
growth transformed the industrial structure and changed substantially the 
needs and conditions of industrial policy. Still, there were very few 
sectors in which Japan was pushing out the frontiers of knowledge. It 
was very successful learning and applying the best proven technologies, 
but with only incremental improvements. Even so, MITI was beginning to 
generate visions of "knowledge-intensive" (high tech) industries. 
Japanese industrial policy as an ideal type came into its own in the 
high-growth era. It is useful to characterize it first in these ideal-
type terms, next to indicate the changes that have taken place in indus-
trial policy in the past decade, and then in the next section to provide 
an appraisal of the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of Japanese indus-
trial policy in both its historical and present contexts. 
Japanese Industrial Policy as an Ideal-Type 
Ideal-types are a useful device for deriving general theoretical 
principles and patterns, even though they have been only imperfectly 
achieved in reality. The following depiction, by being formulated in 
idealized (one might say antiseptic) terms, provides a basis both to 
evaluate changes in Japanese actual high tech industrial policies and 
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practices over the past decade and to appraise its relevance for possible 
American industrial policy. A cautionary note is important: to describe 
the ideal-type means neither that it was the way industrial policy 
operated in practice nor that it had particularly effective results. 
Indeed, as is considered in the next section, I am skeptical of the 
claims put forth as to the great effectiveness of Japanese industrial 
policy. 
Japanese industrial policy has been pragmatic and economic in its 
orientation. The basic goal has been to create the productive capacity 
for rapid growth by accelerating the transfer of resources to the major 
industries of the future, while smoothing the process of decline of 
uncompetitive industries, "picking winners and phasing out losers." In 
principle "winners" should meet the following criteria: industries of 
significant size in which Japan would have future comparative advantage 
as the relative supplies and costs of its factors of production changed 
with domestic growth and evolving international economic conditions, and 
as learning curve economies were achieved (infant industry cases); 
industries for which domestic and world demand would be highly income 
elastic; and industries in which Japan would become internationally price 
competitive. However, as is discussed below, only in the past decade has 
the general level of technology, human and physical capital, and economic 
production provided an adequate base for Japanese industry to move into 
high technology industries in any broad-based way. 
The emphasis of Japanese industrial policy has been on economic 
growth and economically efficient resource allocation. Economic effi-
ciency has come to be defined in terms of world markets, not (protected) 
domestic markets, and in terms of competitive prices, high quality, and 
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other non-price attributes. In contrast, a major goal of American 
industrial policy has been to maintain the industrial basis for military 
strength, in terms of quality and quantity but not of price. The con-
trast in policy goals between American military prowess (and the develop-
ment of comparative advantage and export sales in military hardware) and 
Japanese economic and commercial strength is striking. The United States 
has also pursued policies to help specific industries, such as textiles, 
steel, and automobiles — largely to "save" jobs — but mainly by 
restriction of imports. Agriculture is one sector in which American 
industrial policy has been most successful. While there may be a major 
distinction in principle between the Japanese emphasis on efficient 
resource allocation and U.S. and Western European emphasis on the redis-
tribution of income, the political economies in practice are not so 
different; Japanese policymakers have continuously provided support for 
inefficient but politically powerful farmers and small businesses on the 
grounds of more equal income distribution. 
Japanese industrial policy has been designed, implemented, and 
justified by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 
MITI has been quick to argue market failure, so-called excessive competi-
tion, the need to catch up to best Western technologies and practices, 
and hence the need for government intervention. Its rationale (at times 
after the fact) for industrial policy has included the following themes. 
The private market mechanism inadequately allocates resources for long-
run growth; MITI officials emphasize instances of market failure (exter-
nal economies or diseconomies, public good effects, private underinvest-
ment in R&D) and Japanese labor and capital market imperfections. One 
senior MITI official has argued that Japanese are so locked into their 
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own company (group) and are so competitive vis a vis others that they go 
beyond the bounds of normal economic behavior and engage in excessive 
competition — with each other as much as with foreigners. 
MITI officials apparently believe they can better anticipate the 
long-run strategic needs of the economy than the marketplace, which 
inevitably has too short a time horizon and is unwilling to assume enough 
risk quickly enough. They believe they can anticipate where the market 
will go, thereby speeding up its operation. The goal is to reach the 
same place as the market solution but more rapidly and (in the case of 
declining industries) at less social cost. While not so clearly stated, 
underlying the definition of future key industries is a strategic sense 
as to what industrial structure will be required for Japan to be a major 
economic power ten to twenty years in the future. Currently, this 
includes semiconductors, computers, telecommunications, nuclear energy, 
and other high tech industries. Since the late 1970s, MITI has placed 
greater emphasis on the other aspect of industrial policy, namely, 
assisting in the structural adjustment process of major uncompetitive, 
declining industries such as aluminum, petrochemicals, and textiles. The 
MITI rationale is pragmatic: in scaling down an industry it is more 
efficient to close the least efficient plants and achieve economies 
through (government-encouraged) merger than bankruptcy. 
The Japanese implementation of industrial policy has several impor-
tant elements. First, once an industry has been selected for support, 
MITI has put together (in negotiations with the Ministry of Finance) a 
comprehensive package of support: accelerated depreciation allowances, 
special R&D funding (often through the industry association) and tax 
benefits, loans through the Japan Development Bank or other government 
- 16 -
financial institutions, and so forth. Second, the policy measures try to 
anticipate and to use the marketplace rather than replacing it, by 
providing various incentives to business to allocate resources as 
desired. Such a policy package, based on market incentives to encourage 
business behavior in desired directions, contrasts with the more piece-
meal American approach of reliance on a single instrument in aiding 
specific industries without building in incentives to alter business 
behavior, as exemplified by de facto restrictions on imports of textiles, 
automobiles, or steel. 
Third, MITI policy in principle has encouraged the combination of a 
competitive environment and of effective economies of plant scale in any 
chosen industry. Indeed, this was the real success of Japanese indus-
trial policy in the high growth era of the 1950s and 1960s: rapid, 
efficient industrialization involving entry of new firms, which promoted 
competition in the domestic market. Non-Japanese firms were generally 
not allowed in during the early stages, but there was sufficient compe-
tition to make firms efficiency-oriented even as they profited from a 
protected market. Thus Japan, more rapidly than other nations industri-
alizing behind import barriers, was able to achieve international compe-
titiveness in a number of new important industries, ranging from consumer 
electronics to steel to small cars to certain types of semiconductors and 
computers. To be sure this was not neoclassical ideal-type perfect 
competition. Rather, it involved firms competing in dynamic oligopoly 
market structures. Consumers paid relatively high prices, especially in 
the early stages of an industry; but MITI-encouraged pressures to in-
crease efficiency and productivity and to reduce costs so as to become 
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internationally competitive (typically with the threat of eventual loss 
of protection) eventually brought domestic prices down as well. However, 
there were important exceptions to this generally positive picture, 
notably petroleum refining, where optimum scale and low-cost production 
was not achieved. 
Just how micro has Japanese industrial policy been? Let us consider 
three levels: an individual firm; an industry, narrowly or more broadly 
defined; and a productive sector, such as manufacturing, construction, 
agriculture, or services. Japanese industrial policy has been at the 
industry level, usually rather broadly defined. MITI has not chosen 
individual firms as national champions; it has not particularly favored 
one large firm over another; while it will help an industry in trouble, 
it usually will not help an individual firm in trouble of its own making. 
However, its policies have usually benefitted large firms relative to 
small. This seems to have been particularly the case with high tech 
industries in which only a few large firms have been able to participate 
in government-sponsored R&D projects, or those of the government-owned 
Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) monopoly. The robotics industry is 
one counter-example, but none of the early entrants were very large. 
At the broad sectoral level the cumulative effect of both industrial 
policy and macro economic policy was to provide preferential access to 
resources to business, especially large firms, at the expense of housing, 
consumer credit, or social infrastructure. Agriculture, a lagging sec-
tor, also received special help. In the United States, in contrast, 
resources were preferentially allocated to defense, aerospace, and hous-
ing as well as agriculture (which is subsidized in all major advanced 
industrial nations). And within industry it may well be that the macro 
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system of tax and other incentives have affected specific industries in 
the United States even more differentially than in Japan; certainly the 
taxation of corporate profits varies more widely by industry in the 
United States. 
The Japanese domestic policy environment has been quite favorable to 
industrial policy and to economic policy generally. High priority is 
still given in Japanese government policymaking to economic issues, 
domestic and international. However, changing economic and political 
circumstances (as is discussed below) has brought about major shifts in 
the relative importance of various objectives. The almost simple-minded 
focus in the 1950s and '60s on economic growth and efficient resource 
allocation through the private sector resulted in an unbalanced growth 
pattern with insufficient attention to environmental problems, housing, 
and social infrastructure. As is discussed below, by the early 1970s 
economic policy came to embody a broader mix of goals, including price 
stability and social welfare (mainly transfer payments for health and old 
age). Even so, the emphasis has persistently been on private enterprise 
and the operation (and influencing) of the market mechanism, with the 
first claim on scarce resources going to business not government. 
Japanese are very competitive, and there are many areas and problems 
of conflict in Japan as in other societies. Japanese society is built on 
individual participation in groups -- the family, the school class, the 
work place -- and societal norms stress the importance of harmony through 
cooperation and at least formal consensus. This mutes and makes more 
subtle the normal conflicts of interest and adversarial relationships of 
life. Accordingly labor-management relations and government-business 
relations are considerably more cooperative and mutually beneficial than 
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in the adversarial, suspicious, more individualistic American society and 
its institutions; in Japan these relationships are seen as positive-sum, 
not zero-sum, games. Of course in a rapidly growing economy distribu-
tional issues were less salient and cooperation easier; it made more 
sense to focus on increasing the size of the pie than how to slice it up. 
And business in Japan has benefitted substantially from the continuance 
in power of the pro-business, conservative Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) 
ever since 1955. It has also benefitted from an easier antitrust envi-
ronment within which, with MITI approval, targeted industries could form 
temporary anti-recession cartels and high tech firms could participate in 
joint R&D projects (Yamamura, this volume). I consider the implications 
of different institutional arrangements in Japan and the United States in 
the final section. 
Changes in Japanese Industrial Policy in the Past Decade 
Over the past decade Japanese industrial policy has changed signifi-
cantly as Japan has achieved affluence ("caught up with the West"), 
business has become strong and independent, growth has slowed greatly, 
the price of energy has risen dramatically, and Japan has adopted a free 
trade policy and greatly liberalized most of its imports. These have 
affected substantially the goals, policy instruments, and policy environ-
ment for industrial policy. 
Two major trends are discernable in the recent evolution of Japanese 
industrial policy. Industrial policy has become less important in 
overall government economic policy, in terms both of the objectives and 
the instruments of industrial policy. And industrial policy has devel-
oped a tripartite focus: high tech industries, the winners of the 
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future; major, structurally depressed, industries in trouble; and energy 
and, to some degree, other natural resources. 
First affluence, then much-slowed growth, have greatly altered the 
general policy environment for industrial policy. In the early 1970s the 
public debate on unbalanced growth resulted in increased priority for 
social infrastructure, pollution and other environmental control, social 
welfare (especially retirement and health benefits), and housing. Thus 
the share of general government expenditures in GNP has risen by more 
than 10 percentage points, to 33 percent by 1980. Moreover, business 
came to be seen, correctly, as strong and able to grow on its own; major 
industries no longer needed the special benefits of industrial protec-
tion. Moreover, with strength came greater desire by big business for 
independence from MITI and other government bureaucrats; business leaders 
do not want to be beholden to or dependent upon them, and are more 
resistant of their intrusion. 
The two oil crises, much-slowed growth, and the rapid transition 
from a neoclassical to a Keynesian economy has probably had an even more 
profound effect. Until 1974 economic growth was fueled by high rates of 
business investment and high rates of saving; the operative constraint in 
other than brief cyclical downturn was supply capacity relative to bur-
geoning demand. Since 1974 the constraint on growth has been inadequate 
private and total domestic aggregate demand. Saving rates have declined 
somewhat but remained high; private business investment has slowed more 
rapidly, so that ex ante saving has been substantially greater than 
investment demand. Pump-priming through huge deficit-financed increases 
in government expenditures has covered part of the gap but not all. And 
the need for deficit-financing persisted in time and amount beyond the 
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political will to engage in it; by 1983 Japanese public sector debt, 
which had been negligible a decade earlier, was a larger percentage of 
GNP than in the United States. 
This made the traditional emphasis of industrial policy on winners 
much less important. With the economy awash in surplus saving, most in 
financial assets, the problem was how to encourage businessmen, indeed 
anyone, to invest and spend rather than how to ration credit to them. 
With slow growth, income redistribution became more important than 
economic efficiency in the political economy of government policy. 
Government resources went increasingly to farmers, small business, and 
old people. 
In the past several years the main focus of government policy has 
been on the macro problems associated with the huge central government 
budget deficits. The political decision has been to reduce the budget 
deficit even at the cost of slower growth (so much for the rapid growth 
policy of yesteryear); because it has been politically impossible to 
raise corporate or personal income tax rates, the main effort has been to 
hold the line or reduce expenditures. The narrowing of the deficit, from 
6 percent to slightly under 4 percent of GNP, has been the consequence of 
the upward drift of tax revenues in GNP due to progressive tax rates and 
a leveling off of the rise in expenditures. In a related move Prime 
Minister Nakasone has given priority to broadly-defined ftadministrative 
reform," including deregulation of industry and finance, reduced budget 
subsidies to agriculture, and fundamental reorganization of certain 
public corporations, notably the deficit-ridden Japan National Railways 
which has been a major drain on the government budget. Big business has 
pushed hard for these reforms and other measures to hold down growth of 
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government expenditures, correctly perceiving that otherwise tax 
increases would fall heavily on business, at least directly. 
One of the most important changes in the policy environment is that 
Japan is no longer insulated from the rest of the world. Foreign govern-
mental pressures -- especially American — have intruded on the cozy 
domestic arrangements that have been so much a part of Japanese indus-
trial policy. Japan is now a major economy and world trader -- indeed, 
the challenger of American and European industrial might -- first in 
steel and cars and now semiconductors, computers, telecommunications and 
other high tech areas. Its actions, policy and otherwise, inevitably 
invite scrutiny and at times reactions by the United States and others. 
Japan has truly become an interdependent member of an interdependent 
world. As one of the three pillars of the liberal international economic 
order — together with the United States and the Western European indus-
trial democracies — Japan can no longer use trade policy as an instru-
ment of industrial policy; it must reduce trade barriers, not raise them. 
The variety and power of policy instruments to implement industrial 
policy have been reduced substantially. Most importantly, in the present 
world environment and given Japan1s commitment to the liberal trading 
system in principle, MITI is no longer able to impose foreign exchange or 
import restrictions -- tariffs, quotas, non-tariff barriers -- to help 
new potential winner industries. Import barriers for most high tech 
industries have now typically been reduced to minor levels. New indus-
tries and new products cannot benefit from newly imposed barriers. 
Japanese policy and behavior is rather closely monitored, especially by 
the United States, in order to press for further liberalization and to 
prevent new restrictions. 
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As Trezise (1983) points out, as a share of GNP, government resourc-
es going to business are not large relative to the United States and 
Western Europe; and most of those resources do not go to the three 
categories targeted by industrial policy -- high technology, declining 
industries, and energy. The largest proportion of government subsidies 
go to agriculture, then energy, small business, and the Japan National 
Railways. Government R&D expenditures are relatively low (Nelson 1984). 
About half go through the Ministry of Education for university science 
and technology support including faculty salaries and administrative 
costs. About a quarter is allocated to the Science and Technology Agency 
for essentially high tech purposes: space, ocean, and energy projects. 
About an eighth of government R&D expenditures come under MITI jurisdic-
tion; more than half of that goes for energy. MITI's funds to support 
* 
manufacturing R&D were on the order of a modest $350 million in fiscal 
1983 (Trezise 1983). 
The government provides selective tax benefits, but they are widely 
dispersed; everyone gets something. The Ministry of Finance has calcu-
lated gross revenue losses in fiscal 1981 from all special tax measures 
were about 1,100 billion yen (about $5 billion). Half was for exemptions 
on interest on deposits for small savers, another quarter was related to 
health and other social insurance. Somewhat more than $1 billion went to 
business in accelerated depreciation, special reserve accounts and R&D 
tax credits. While the government loan program through its financial 
institutions is not inconsequential (though less than 10 percent of total 
loans), most now goes to small business. Export credits are for ships 
and plants -- standard big-ticket items. The Japan Development Bank, 
always viewed as a prime instrument of industrial policy, has lost its 
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focus and historic rationale. Energy is now the single largest category 
in its incremental loan portfolio, on the order of 40 percent (about $2 
billion in 1981). Only some 10 percent went to high tech industries 
other than energy. 
MITI is losing its historic role as the predominant initiator, 
agent, and implementer of industrial policy. Many relevant issues of 
high tech (and other) industrial policy no longer fall pre-eminently in 
its manufacturing sector domain. The Science and Technology Agency and 
the Ministry of Education are in the high tech R&D act. This is not just 
in terms of budget resources, as the current inter-ministerial conflict 
on the appropriate law for copyrighting or patenting computer software 
exemplify. Telecommunications and NTT (Nippon Telephone and Telegraph) 
come under the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications; it is initiating 
the new legislation on use of telecommunications lines for value-added-
networks (VAN) linking computers and data banks. The Ministry of Welfare 
is responsible for standards and other procedures which continue to 
restrict imports of pharmaceuticals, medical equipment and the like. 
For all these reasons, coherence in Japanese industrial policy has 
attenuated. However, one should not count industrial policy or MITI's 
role in it out, especially in the high technology arena. High tech 
industries have three major needs: assured markets; encouragement of 
R&D; and finance. Government procurement, including that of NTT and 
other public corporations, provides an immense market still substantially 
protected by a wide range of "buy Japanese" regulations and tax incen-
tives. High tech R&D is encouraged through tax write-offs, government 
loans, subsidies, government industrial research labs (many under MITI 
jurisdiction), favorable antitrust provisions and government funding for 
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joint, cooperative, R&D projects among major corporations. Finance 
depends on industrial structure. Large firms moving into high tech 
activities can readily utilize internal funds and borrowing capacity. 
The major problem has been the provision of risk capital to new, small 
firms. Venture capital institutions are in their infancy, but that is 
now rapidly changing. Quite large amounts of Japanese and foreign 
venture capital funds apparently are becoming readily available; the 
problem is mainly to develop venture capital markets, and to create the 
environment where creative scientists and engineers (typically in large 
firms) are willing to leave secure positions and become entrepreneurs. 
These issues are elaborated upon with substantial industry-specific 
detail in the companion essays in this volume by Imai, Okimoto, 
Saxonhouse, and Yamamura. 
While MITI's activist role in an industrial policy for high tech 
industry and energy has to be coordinated with a number of other minis-
tries in addition to its traditional working relationship with the 
Ministry of Finance, it has continued to reign supreme in industrial 
policy for the structurally depressed manufacturing industries hit by 
high energy costs (aluminum, petrochemicals, etc), low world demand 
(shipbuilding), or high labor costs (textiles, simple assembly opera-
tions). Of course, Japan's largest uncompetitive industry is agricul-
ture, over which MITI has no jurisdiction. Considerable MITI effort 
since the late 1970s has gone into policies for losers, as reflected in 
the successful efforts to have the Structurally Depressed Industries Law 
passed in 1979 and revised and extended in 1983. This is a new thrust, 
and is dictated by the twin realities of great structural uncompetitive-
ness and slow domestic growth. While government industrial policy 
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earlier helped adjustment in coal mining and cotton textiles in the 
1960s, labor transfer was achieved fairly smoothly because rapid growth 
created other job opportunities. Earlier structural adjustment programs 
were primarily bail-outs of the owners and their financiers. Even in the 
present slow job-opportunity growth environment that may well be the 
situation for more recent programs in structural adjustment as well. 
§3. Evaluation of Japanese Industrial Policy 
In my judgment, industrial policy has been somewhat beneficial for 
the Japanese economy but its role and efficacy has been overrated by 
many. Japan has pursued a relatively coherent industrial policy, but its 
effect has not always been as intended, in degree or in direction. MITI 
has supported a number of specific industries and has had some notable 
successes. It has had some important failures — even aside from the 
promotion of petrochemical, aluminum, and other energy intensive indus-
tries in the 1960s which were made uncompetitive by the sharp rises in 
energy prices in the 1970s. And there are a number of important indus-
tries, such as automobiles and consumer electronics -- indeed virtually 
all consumer goods -- in which the government did not take any differen-
tially supportive role but which have succeeded on their own. 
The Effectiveness Debate 
There is no clear consensus among specialists on Japan's political 
economy regarding the effectiveness of Japanese industrial policy. 
Rather, there are honest differences of opinion among respected scholars. 
This is not the place to review that debate and its considerable litera-
ture in any detail, but its existence needs to be borne in mind. Broadly 
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speaking, there are two schools. By considering each in its stereotypic 
form, the nature of the debate is illuminated, even though most special-
ists place themselves somewhere between these two extremes. 
One school sees Japan as embodying a state-guided capitalist system 
in which MITI and industrial policy have played a central role. In this 
view, government leadership has been the key to Japan1s economic success, 
with business a willing follower. An extreme version of this approach is 
encapsulated in the phrase "Japan Inc.," which is, however, a red her-
ring; all scholars agree it is too simplistic and naive a concept for 
what is a much more complex, variegated, multi-dimensional set of rela-
tionships among the triad of Liberal-Democratic Party politicians, cen-
tral government bureaucrats, and big business leaders. Essentially, 
the responsibility for determining the goals of economic policy and 
seeing to it they are achieved is attributed to the bureaucracy: politi-
cians reign, bureaucrats rule, business follows. 
Chalmers Johnson has provided the most sophisticated argument for 
the efficacy and centrality of Japanese industrial policy, in his out-
standing book MITI and the Japanese Miracle (1982) and other recent 
writings (1984) and speeches. But his, and this school's, main point is 
more fundamental: Japanese capitalism has a different structure from 
that of Western capitalism; there is a "Japanese system" of capitalism. 
In it the main role of the state is developmental; in the West it is 
regulatory. Johnson has well stated this position in a speech before the 
Japan Society (1983): 
There are four fundamental structural features that exist in 
all the East Asian capitalist developmental states, including 
Japan. These are: (1) stable rule by a political-bureaucratic 
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elite that does not accede to political demands that would 
undermine economic growth; (2) cooperation between public and 
private sectors under the overall guidance of a pilot planning 
agency; (3) heavy and continuing investment in education for 
everyone, combined with policies to ensure the equitable 
distribution of the wealth created by high-speed growth; and 
(4) a government that understands the need to use and respect 
methods of intervention based on the price mechanism. 
In this perspective, industrial policy is embedded in the system, and is 
a key feature of it. Data on the relatively modest level of government 
resources going to high tech (or other) industries do not adequately 
affect their initiating impact in this model of state-led, private 
sector-implemented capitalism because of systemic features and signaling 
effects to private industry and finance. These themes are also developed 
by Zysman and Cohen (1983) among others. 
The other school denies the validity either of the state-leadership 
developmental model, or of an otherwise defined model specific to the 
Japanese economic system, or of the central and efficacious role of 
industrial policy in it. These themes have become intertwined in the 
debate, but conceptually one can disentangle them. One thus can hold 
that Japanese institutions and practices cumulate to define a distinctive 
Japanese economic system but in which industrial policy does not play a 
particularly central, effective, or coherent role. Alternatively, one 
might argue that specific institutional differences are not so fundamen-
tal that they comprise a distinctive system but that industrial policy is 
important and effective. Or, one can hold that while Japan has articu-
lated and pursued an industrial policy and does indeed have certain 
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specific institutional features, neither are central to our understanding 
of the basic characteristics of the Japanese economy and its economic 
performance. 
The second school sees the basic source of Japan1s economic growth 
as being in a vigorous private sector which, taking advantage of the 
private market mechanism, has energetically, imaginatively and diligently 
engaged in productive business investment., commercially-oriented research 
and development, in the saving to finance those activities, and in the 
development of a supportive system of labor-management relations. Busi-
ness entrepreneurs were and are the engine of growth. At the same time, 
the government is given credit for having pursued macro demand and indus-
trial policies beneficial to private sector growth. The government 
helped contribute to a favorable economic environment -- as did the 
postwar international economic system — but the major impetus to growth 
was from the private, market-oriented sector. 
The most articulate proponent of this position is Philip Trezise, 
who has argued that Japan has an industrial policy but it is not particu-
larly coherent, focused, or effective. An early statement appears in 
Asia1s New Giant (Trezise 1976); recent statements include his testimony 
before the Joint Economic Committee (1983) and his essay in the Brookings 
Review (1983). Lincoln takes this position in an essay which, among 
other themes, is critical of the first school (1984). My own view (ini-
tially stated in Patrick and Rosovsky, 1976, ch. 1) is that industrial 
policy may well have helped the growth process to some degree, but it 
did not play a leading or central role. 
The Japanese central government bureaucracy is certainly able and 
powerful; however, it is by no means monolithic Japanese ministries are 
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more entrenched and autonomous than their counterparts in the United 
States. Each ministry has its own, at times self-serving, definition of 
the national interest. The Ministry of Finance, and certainly the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, perceive the national 
interest quite differently than MITI. MITI and the Fair Trade Commission 
take different positions on antitrust and industrial policy. Jurisdic-
tional disputes and turf problems are as abundant in Japan as in other 
national bureaucracies. While MITI has jurisdiction regarding the 
domestic activities and foreign trade of most manufactures, other minis-
tries have responsibility for certain important sectors: Ministry of 
Finance for all the financial institutions, Posts and Telecommunications 
for telecommunications, Welfare for medical equipment and pharmaceuti-
cals, Agriculture for food processing, Transport for civil air transport, 
shipping, trucking and taxis, for example. MITIfs industrial policy does 
not and cannot cover all industrial activities. 
Government policies that encourage all industries, such as import 
protection in the 1950s and '60s, in effect protect none differentially. 
The main result is simply to give priority to business over households. 
This is important, because the essence of industrial policy is that it 
differentiates among industries by providing only certain industries 
specially large incentives. Recent research by Saxonhouse (1982, 1983, 
1984) indicates that the differential impact among industries has prob-
ably been substantially less than earlier believed. This supports an 
earlier study by Pechman and Kaizuka (1976) on specific tax concessions 
granted to specific industries; they make the point that such concessions 
were so widespread, despite being specific to each industry, that the 
differential impact was relatively modest. Japanese industrial policy 
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may have started on a micro basis with specific priorities, and some 
certainly persisted; but the bandwagon effect became so widespread, 
especially in trade protection, but also in tax concessions, that its 
effect was akin to a macro industrial policy of helping virtually all 
industry. 
If industrial policy is successful, one might expect an industrial 
structure quite different from what would result from the operation of 
purely market forces. A successfully anticipatory industrial policy 
might in the long run result in the same industrial structure, but at any 
point in time one would expect supported "winner" industries to be 
overrepresented and "loser" industries underrepresented. Yet this has 
not been the case. Japanese industrial structure has been and is very 
similar to other industrial nations when adjustments are made for market 
size, per capita income level, natural resource endowment, and distance 
from world markets (Saxonhouse, 1982, 1983, 1984, and his essay in this 
volume). This is not to say that past Japanese industrial policy has not 
had substantial effects. However, it does indicate the picture is more 
complex and .less well understood than some would suggest. 
The results of MITIfs policies in targeting specific industries have 
been mixed in practice. One can credit the combination of MITI policy, 
market forces, and the mixture of Japanese business leadership and 
follow-the-leader business behavior for having created a generally highly 
competitive market environment in Japan. And there have been industries 
targeted successfully. However, industrial policy has not been success-
ful in a number of major industries, with consequent high costs to 
consumers, savers, or taxpayers. The government in the 1950s and 1960s, 
through the Japan Development Bank, pumped immense amounts of low-cost 
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loans to marginal profitable ocean shipping firms, since private finan-
cial institutions refused to lend much. MITI has long targeted the 
commercial aircraft industry, with no commercial success. It could not 
prevent excessive domestic entrants into vehicle production for the 
domestic market, and later was unable to effect merger among competing 
smaller producers. The fundamental problems of the automobile industry 
have been masked in the 1980s by the so-called voluntary export re-
straints to the American market which in practice have significantly 
raised prices and profits on those sales for all Japanese producers. The 
greatest MITI failure, however, has been in the way it handled scale and 
entry in the petroleum refining industry. In order to reduce the large 
foreign share in Japanese oil refining, MITI promoted the entry — under 
pressure from a number of business groups each of which wanted a piece of 
the action — a large number of too small Japanese refining plants and 
companies with inadequate capacities to upgrade facilities to optimum 
scale. The successive oil crises and pressures for trade liberalization 
since 1973 have made clear the failure and high social cost of the 
MITI-generated structure of Japanrs petroleum refining industry. These 
mistaken policies and problems have carried over into some petrochemical 
products as well. 
The ultimate test of the success of Japanese industrial policy is 
whether it led to a significantly more rapid GNP growth rate than would 
have occurred otherwise. This is at the core of the scholarly debate. 
Japanese industrial policy in general seems to have anticipated where the 
market would have taken the industrial structure anyway, though with some 
major exceptions as first noted. MITI's role and contribution was to 
encourage certain industries, which were already growth industries, to 
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develop sooner than they might have otherwise. If so, such an industrial 
policy may have had some success in accelerating the growth rate. There 
are now a number of recent case studies which provided data and insights 
on the role and effectiveness of Japanese industrial policy in specific 
industries, including Okimoto, Sugano, and Weinstein (1984), Dore (1983), 
Borrus, Millstein, and Zysman (1983), Wheeler, Janow, and Pepper (1982), 
Magaziner and Hout (1980), and U.S. government publications (ITC 1983, 
GAO 1982a, GAO 1982b). The problem is that we do not yet have compre-
hensive, definitive studies which determine conclusively the degree and 
nature of the effectiveness of Japanese industrial policy, especially for 
Japan's overall growth performance. 
New Policy Needs 
Industrial policy in Japan today is in a fundamentally different 
position than it was some 10-15 years ago. Its goals are less clear-cut, 
more diffuse; there is a new focus on high technology industries, but the 
ability to identify and pick "winner" products and processes has de-
creased sharply; and the range and strength of policy instruments has 
diminished sharply. There have been a number of major forces, but two in 
particular, at work to bring about this sharply changed environment for 
high technology industrial policy. First, from about the mid-1970s, 
depending on the industry, Japan has reached the technology frontier in 
most civilian goods sectors; it no longer is a follower nation. Having 
caught up, Japan no longer has the American model of evolving industrial 
structure. While very specific technologies may be identifiable, "win-
ners" are no longer so obvious; it is considerably more difficult for 
MITI bureaucrats to pick them. Second, until the early 1970s, protection 
from imports was used as a major policy instrument to support Japanese 
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manufacturers. Japan, as a major leader in the international economic 
system, can no longer utilize trade barriers very effectively to assist 
high technology industries. 
Nonetheless, we should not underestimate the Japanese government's 
ability to implement a high technology industrial policy, and in ways 
consonant with present GATT rules. The focus of Japanese government 
attention on high tech industries is a recent phenomenon. Most impor-
tantly, it is a natural consequence of the long-run process of industri-
alization. Only after Japan had achieved a high level of technological 
sophistication, capital stock, human skills -- Mcaught up with the West" 
in the slogan of the 1970s — was it a natural step to move into high 
tech industries. And this has been predominantly a private sector 
phenomenon, as firms have developed new products and what are now catego-
rized as entirely new industries. As Dore (1983) has perceptively 
discussed, in the latter half of the 1970s a consensus began to emerge in 
Japan which visualized Japan as a producer as well as consumer of tech-
nology. This was due in part to the worldwide tendency to attach greater 
importance to technological innovation, in part to greater self-
confidence within the business, government and academic technology elite 
within Japan. The enunciated rationale for government involvement is 
textbook: very large scale projects, high uncertainty, long lead times, 
thereby high risk, and social need. 
Given a different set of industries, new needs, and the new interna-
tional environment, the mix of instruments for high tech industrial 
policy is almost necessarily different from that of one or two decades 
earlier. Standard protectionist trade policy instruments -- tariffs or 
import quotas -- are no longer a feasible way to help high tech 
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industries; U.S. and other foreign governmental pressures are too strong. 
Those pressures are not limited to trade; equal access to Japanese 
markets for foreign-owned firms operating in Japan is of comparable 
importance, as reflected in emphasis on the rule of equal national 
treatment. Nonetheless, Japanese high tech. firms continue to have 
preferential access to Japanese government procurement. This is enhanced 
in high tech industries by close linkages between R&D prototype develop-
mental activities and subsequent equipment purchases, especially in 
(though not limited to) NTT and telecommunications. 
Other essays in this volume provide considerable information on and 
analysis of Japanese high tech industrial policy, ranging from specific 
industry studies to overall assessments. Inevitably and desirably, 
government support to R&D receives major attention, in part because it is 
the main instrument MITI uses to encourage research in the development of 
a wide range of fairly specific products. At issue are both the institu-
tional arrangements, notably joint research by major companies typically 
under government auspices, and government funding of R&D. 
Of MITIfs 1983 R&D expenditure budget of 2,244 million yen ($955 
million), 45 percent was for energy, 28 percent for infrastructure 
consolidation (including certain MITI labs and the patent system), and 18 
percent for high tech projects (Dore, 1983, Table 2). These are rela-
tively modest amounts of resources spread over a number of projects. 
Most projects, however, involve substantially larger multi-year commit-
ments. Dore (1983) concludes, in his case study of the twelve projects 
of the ten-year "next generation base technologies program" begun in 1981 
(and comprising only 3 percent of MITIfs 1983 R&D budget) that almost all 
the projects were selected well prior to the commercialization stage, by 
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reasonable criteria, through consultation of young MITI officials with 
industry and to some extent academic specialists. He argues that the 
generation of economic rents (that is, the financing of projects private 
firms would do anyway) is limited because the funding is for contract 
research with patents going to the government; and that the receipt of 
contracts strengthened the position of industry researchers in their 
respective firms, perhaps inducing thereby a larger commitment of firm 
resources. 
Declining Industries 
While much attention has been directed to Japanese industrial policy 
for high tech industries, easing the structural adjustment of declining 
industries may become as important a component of overall Japanese 
industrial policy as efforts to pick winners. As Japan's comparative 
advantage continues to evolve— due to the continuing spread of the 
industrial revolution to the developing nations, to Japan's own future 
growth pattern, and to changing world relative prices of energy and other 
commodities and products -- structural adjustment problems will become 
more severe in Japan, as they have in all advanced industrial nations. 
While MITI helped the adjustment process in coal mining and cotton 
textiles in the late 1950s and early f 60s, most of its experience in 
declining industry programs is very recent, indeed underway at present. 
It is more difficult to persuade firms to contract than to expand --
to scrap equipment, reduce capacity, rationalize, merge, change business 
or go out of business. The policy mix is likely to be different too: 
more direct subsidies, greater reliance on low interest rate loans, 
virtually forced closing of plants and even merger of firms. The record 
of industrial policy to date in helping declining industries is mixed. 
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The policy package in the early 1980s for shipbuilding was apparently 
effective; capacity was reduced by one-third without major bankruptcies 
(Uriu, 1984). However, capacity adjustment and reorganization has been 
slower in aluminum, petrochemicals, electric furnace steel, and other 
depressed industries. Aluminum production has dropped precipitously, 
from a capacity of 1.6 million tons to production of 300,000 tons (Sam-
uels, 1983). MITI policy simply has not been able to keep up with the 
dictates of the marketplace, given very high Japanese electricity costs 
and MITI's inability to halt the surge of imports since 1979. 
It is unclear whether industrial policy for declining industries has 
resulted in a more efficient restructuring of firms and industries, or at 
less social cost, than simply allowing the marketplace to work. Indeed 
it is unclear whether MITI policy has anticipated, or simply followed, 
the adjustment process forced by market conditions. However, viewing the 
choice as simply that of adjustment via the free market or via MITI is 
politically naive. These are powerful industries, with large debts to 
powerful banks. It may well be that the Japanese government, for the 
same domestic political reasons as in the United States and all industri-
al democracies, has to take some kind of ameliorative action. The MITI 
programs of structural adjustment of declining industries may not be 
optimal, but they certainly are preferable to such ad_ hoc measures as 
direct government subsidies or new protectionist barriers against compet-
itive imports. 
There is a certain irony that many structurally depressed industries 
in present day Japan are those which two decades earlier were targeted as 
ffwinners,f or at least as basic industries. Part is because MITI offi-
cials, like private and public policymakers everywhere, did not 
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anticipate the energy crisis and fivefold rise in relative prices of 
energy in the 1970s. However part is the consequence of earlier errors 
in selecting targets; it is unlikely that dynamic comparative advantage 
would change so rapidly as to shift an industry from winner to loser 
category in only two decades. 
§4. Implications for the United States 
What is the relevance of Japanese industrial policy for American 
economic policy? There are implications for two major policy areas: 
U.S. trade policy and U.S. industrial policy. In each there are four 
policy options: to take no specific action; to seek Japanese reform; to 
emulate; to counteract its effects on comparable U.S. industries. 
Japanese industrial targeting has come to figure prominently in the 
current American debate on trade policy, being labeled by some as an 
unfair trade practice injurious to the American industry whose Japanese 
counterpart is receiving special Japanese government support. U.S. trade 
law permits countervailing action where Japanese and other imports are 
either subsidized or dumped and thereby cause injury to the domestic 
industry, or where the amount and rate of growth of imports is so large 
as to be the main cause of injury to the domestic industry. U.S. multi-
lateral and bilateral trade negotiations with Japan also aim to eliminate 
Japanese import restrictions which protect targeted Japanese industries 
from competition from the Unites States in the Japanese market. On the 
whole, the implications of Japanese targeting for export competitiveness 
to the American market has generated more vociferous concern, though some 
have voiced concern over limited access to specific Japanese markets as a 
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consequence of industrial targeting even though the particular 
instruments do not fall within the normal trade policy domain. 
An extreme view is that Japanese industrial targeting is per se an 
unfair trade practice because it confers unfair degrees of competitive-
ness on Japanese firms. Under existing American and GATT law only 
current government subsidies are regarded as an unfair practice. Japa-
nese exports essentially are not subsidized at all, so this offers no 
remedy for American import-competing industries. The injury test under 
Section 301 is sufficiently strong that few American industries have been 
able to avail themselves of it. 
The basic problem is what has been termed original sin: the specif-
ic industry exporting to the United States no longer receives targeted 
Japanese government support, but it did earlier in its development. 
Thereby, industrial policy is unfair because of the future advantages it 
creates for export competitiveness. To counteract these effects of 
(Japanese) industrial policy, various legislation has been introduced 
before Congress -- reciprocity bills, bills to strengthen Section 301, 
and bills to strengthen dumping and countervailing duty laws (Suomela, 
1983). In general the main intent and impact of these legislative 
proposals is, under the guise of "unfairness,,f to raise protectionist 
barriers against imports. Implicitly or explicitly the legislation is 
particularly aimed at imports from Japan. 
Governmental support of major industries in almost all industrial 
nations has been almost inevitable. On the one hand, new high technology 
industries -- such as aircraft, computers and semiconductors in the 
United States -- received their initial impetus and support from govern-
ment because of their military-strategic significance. On the other 
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hand, as is stressed by Murakami and Yamamura in this volume, in the 
long-run process of the international spread of the industrial revolution 
virtually every country has been a follower in most industries and 
accordingly has provided its industrial infants protection of one sort or 
another. 
There are two difficulties with the original sin position. First, 
since almost all major industries in all countries received some special 
government support at some stage of their development, they are all 
guilty of original sin. If the United States were to apply the original 
sin argument to Japanese industrial policy, Japan could make a similar 
case against American industries. This is particularly the situation of 
high tech industries, where government-funded R&D and procurement has 
been so important (Nelson 1984 and Eads and Nelson in this volume). 
Second and relatedly, application of the original sin argument by 
the United States against Japan opens a Pandora's box with profound 
implications for the functioning and even the structure of the interna-
tional economic system. It would provide a rationale for Western Europe-
an nations to restrict many American exports, for the United States to 
restrict imports from many newly industrializing, developing economies --
indeed for virtually every country to restrict imports from every other. 
Perhaps an international agreement could be negotiated through GATT to 
set a statute of limitations on original sin, but that seems unrealistic 
and unlikely. 
In sum, the policy approach of trying to counteract the perceived 
effects of Japanese industrial policy by new trade-restrictive 
countervailing measures is not in American national interest. It is 
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protectionist; and it potentially could seriously damage the 
international economic sysjtem. 
Reform of current Japanese industrial policy may be a more sensible 
and viable American trade policy objective* It is unrealistic to expect 
Japan to eschew completely industrial policy in any of its three target 
areas: high technology, energy, and structurally depressed industries. 
Indeed, in a rather unthought-out, decentralized, non-packaged way the 
United States pursues (industrial) policies to help firms in the same 
three areas. The reality is that all advanced industrial nations --
Japan, the United States, Western Europe -- pursue high tech industrial 
policies, through R&D support, government procurement, regulatory mecha-
nisms, and outright subsidies. Each government tries to succor its own, 
even within a market context. 
The aim of U.S. efforts to reform Japanese industrial policy is, and 
should be, to achieve free trade flows, equal market access, and equal 
national treatment for competitive American firms in Japan -- in both 
high tech and declining industries. Beyond that, national policies 
supporting the development of high tech industries, the presumed future 
winners, does not contravene the rules of the international economic 
system -- so long as support is not explicitly anti-trade. The problem 
of course is that all targeted support is implicitly biased against 
imports or for exports in the favored industry, and conversely in those 
industries not receiving such special benefits. Favored industries 
benefit; those not favored are hurt; the macro implications are not 
clear. Given the close intertwining of military and economic strategic 
objectives in government high tech policies, it is unlikely that a better 
set of international trade rules can be devised and adopted. 
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Proponents of an American industrial policy a la Japan seem to 
intend more of an emulation of perceived Japanese success than a fight-
fire-with-fire approach counteracting a Japanese industrial policy which 
may not be desirable but is inevitable. Such an American industrial 
policy involves far more than a few selected institutional changes such 
as easing of the antitrust enforcement provisions and environment for 
corporate joint research activities (Baxter, 1983). As the earlier 
discussion of the concept of industrial policy indicates, an American 
industrial policy would provide preferential support to selected civilian 
industries through a comprehensive package of policy instruments in order 
to enhance their market competitiveness. On the whole the "lessons" of 
Japanese industrial policy for any such American industrial policy should 
be cautionary. 
First, American policymakers should beware of facile generalizations 
and stereotypes about the nature and effectiveness of Japanese industrial 
policy, and on the whole should be skeptical of that experience. The 
evidence is still far from complete. There were many factors at play 
bringing about Japan*s two decades of superfast growth up to 1973 and its 
still-good economic performance of the past decade relative to the United 
States and Western Europe. In my judgment industry-specific industrial 
policy has had a moderately useful, but not the central, role in Japan's 
economic success; it has made less of a policy contribution than macro 
industrial policy or aggregate demand policy. 
Second, it is even less clear whether Japanese-style industrial 
policy in its historical or especially in its current manifestations is 
appropriate for the United States. In what ways and to what extent can 
an industrial policy system be incorporated into the ideology of American 
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economic policy and help achieve its basic goals, and fit into the 
existing panoply of policy instruments, institutional arrangements, and 
governmental administrative structure? The answers are not at all clear. 
Third, what I have termed macro industrial policy has made a signif-
icant contribution to Japanese growth: general tax incentives to busi-
ness to invest productively and to engage in R&D, and to households to 
save; and the development of a highly effective public education system. 
Macro industrial policy, like industry-specific, can and should rely on 
the marketplace. Thus, the risks, costs, and inability to appropriate 
fully the benefits of R&D mean government funding of R&D can be desir-
able, in both Japan and the United States. One important historical 
reason for Japanese industrial policy was the shortage of capital and an 
inadequate financial institution framework for allocating capital well. 
The United States has very well developed financial markets, and so has 
less need of industrial policy. On the other hand, in certain respects 
Japanese labor markets and institutions work better than their American 
counterparts, notably in on-the-job training and maintenance of high 
rates of employment. Certainly any American industrial policy should 
take into account manpower needs and conditions, but in a macro rather 
than a micro context. 
Fourth, it is easier for a nation to pick potential future winner 
industries when it is in a follower position. It can study the industri-
al structure of more advanced nations to learn its potential future 
competitiveness. However, the United States is at the technological 
frontiers; no other countries provide a model of future industrial 
structure to emulate. It is very unlikely that American government 
bureaucrats, scholars, or other experts can judge better than the 
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marketplace what the specific products and industries of the future will 
be. More general policies -- support of basic R&D, improvement of the 
educational system, general incentives for investment and saving -- will 
be more effective in enhancing sustained economic growth than special 
governmental support of specific new industries. 
Fifth, recent Japanese and American experience suggest that once a 
country is at the technological frontiers, import restrictions may not be 
an efficient instrument of industrial policy either for high tech indus-
tries or for solving the structural problems of mature industries in 
trouble. Moreover, protectionism is not an appropriate policy for 
advanced industrial nations; it is destructive of the generally benefi-
cial international economic system so carefully crafted and nourished 
since 1945. As the preceding discussion and the other essays in this 
volume indicate, Japan does have a high tech industrial policy, or at 
least a set of policy instruments used to promote the growth of high tech 
industries. However, the resources allocated are modest and their 
effectiveness not yet clear. The focus nonetheless is on civilian-goods 
industries and on cost competitiveness. U.S. high tech industries also 
have flourished and benefitted from much the same set of government 
incentives as their Japanese counterparts. However, military-strategic 
needs have been at the forefront, with only partial spillover to civilian 
production. 
Sixth, perhaps the most important lessons from Japanese industrial 
policy are how to deal most effectively with important industries in 
trouble and needing structural adjustments. The realities of the politi-
cal economy of any democratic industrial nation, including the United 
States and Japan, is that the political and social costs of adjustment in 
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major industries are too great to allow a government to rely solely and 
simply upon the market mechanism. Whether consumers and taxpayers and 
economists like it or not, the government is likely to take some steps to 
help American textiles and steel and automobiles, and indeed has done so. 
American policy solutions have tended to be ad hoc, and import restric-
tive. They have not really provided incentives for management and labor 
to bring about the changes needed in those industries if they are to be 
efficient, cost and price competitive. Japanese industrial policy for 
structurally depressed industries may provide a better second-best 
solution than the second-best solutions the United States has been using 
thus far. This is probably where the best case can be made for an 
American industrial policy: to have a coherent, efficient program of 
adjustment for major industries in difficulty. The postwar evidence is 
they will receive help anyway, mainly in the form of protection from 
imports, through the operation of interest group politics in the American 
political system. 
Seventh, if the United States should decide to employ industrial 
policy to achieve important economic objectives, it can learn from the 
Japanese methods of implementation. Policy should be long-run in focus, 
consistent and pro-market (competition-promoting) in approach, and 
mobilize a package of mutually supportive policy instruments. The 
criterion of effectiveness should be economic efficiency, as measured by 
cost and price competitiveness in world, not just United States, markets. 
And, since the benefits of industrial policy in the first instance accrue 
to the owners, managers, and workers of those industries targeted for 
preferential treatment while the costs are borne by taxpayers or consum-
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ers, then the beneficiaries should be required to meet performance goals 
in order to justify the support received. 
Finally, one can regard Japanese industrial policy as reflective and 
symbolic of a whole host of specific institutional differences between 
the Japanese and American capitalist systems. This raises a far broader, 
more speculative, and more important set of issues worthy of a separate 
study. Are the systems fundamentally different? If so, what needs to be 
done about it? These are both empirical and conceptual questions, which 
require an agreed definition not only of the essence of capitalism but on 
its acceptable or unacceptable institutional forms. In my view, Japanese 
capitalism is not fundamentally different from Western capitalism, though 
it is more akin to continental European than Anglo-American cases. All 
capitalist economies share fundamental similarities. U.S.-Japan 
binational comparisons of specific institutional arrangements have the 
danger that it is not clear which country is far out on the spectrum. On 
this matter, all nationalities tend to be xenophobic (or history-culture 
bound): their own institutions, despite all their imperfections, are 
regarded as the norm -- if not better than those anywhere else. 
But suppose Japanese capitalism is fundamentally different. What 
are the policy options for the United States? One option is to adopt the 
Japanese system more or less in toto. Hardly anyone seriously considers 
that as desirable, much less feasible. A second option is to demand that 
Japan change its system so that it becomes just like that of the United 
States (the proposal of Secretary of Commerce Baldridge). This is 
equally infeasible -- and probably equally undesirable. A third option 
is to exclude Japan from the international economic system by establish-
ing special rules (local context, reciprocity, etc) for economic 
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transactions with Japan. This is a perverse and dangerous approach: 
Japan is simply too large and it could result in the dangerous formation 
of discriminatory regional blocs. It would simply be an excuse for 
American protectionism. Rather, the issue is how better to integrate the 
Japanese economy into the world economic system. 
The last option -- I feel the only real option -- is to have a 
general mechanism of adjustment that takes into account differences among 
economies in institutions and in industrial and other economic policies 
as well as in factor endowments. The world does have such a mechanism: 
the multilateral exchange rate system. The flexible exchange rate system 
makes it possible for economies to adjust to institutional as well as 
other changes at home or abroad. With this option working, the others 
are not necessary. The essential feature is not whether exchange rates 
are fixed or fluctuating, but whether the system is truly open, multilat-
eral, freely operating, and based on the free flows of goods, services, 
and capital. In either system, or variants thereof, a country has to 
shape domestic macroeconomic policies — on both the supply and demand 
side — in light of the realities of economic interdependence as reflect-
ed in balance of payments and exchange rate relationships. In 
macro-systemic terms the case has yet to be made that it matters economi-
cally whether one country pursues an industrial policy or not. 
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